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This paper examines the economic challenges faced by Australia’s Direct
Action abatement subsidy scheme. Introduced in 2014, the scheme operates
by reverse auction, funding projects voluntarily proposed by the private sec-
tor. Because the Government cannot know true project counterfactuals, the
lowest auction bids are likely to often be non-additional “anyway” projects.
The scheme is hence likely to exhibit a systematic skew towards low-quality
abatement. The paper presents a model of the adverse selection problem and
describes the early experience with Direct Action. A discussion of a way for-
ward is also provided.
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1. Introduction
Adverse selection occurs when an information asymmetry leads to one side of a market self-selecting
in a way that exposes the other side of the market to low-quality outcomes. The concept emerged in
insurance, take up of which can be dominated by those with above-average exposure to risks.2
Adverse selection can occur in many other contexts, including the market for second-hand vehicles,
which Akerlof (1970) famously described as being undermined by “lemons.” This paper documents
how adverse selection presents serious challenges for Australia’s principal climate policy instrument
under the Direct Action Plan (“Direct Action”).
The centrepiece of Direct Action is an economy-wide abatement subsidy scheme established via
amendments to the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (CFI Act) in 2014.3 The
scheme uses a reverse auction to allocate payments from an Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF). The
process involves entities submitting sealed bids to implement registered emissions reduction projects,
with the Clean Energy Regulator (CER) selecting the lowest bids per unit of notional abatement. The
auction winners enter contracts with the Commonwealth Government to deliver Australian Carbon
Credit Units (ACCUs), each representing a tonne of CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) emissions reduction
below an assumed baseline. Taxpayer-funded payments against these contracts occur subsequent to
the delivery of the abatement. The standard crediting period is seven years.
*This paper has been informed by conversations with stakeholders and researchers. Thank you for your
contributions.
1Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia.
2Rowell and Connelly (2012) report that the term “adverse selection” has been used since the 19th Century.
3See the Climate Change Authority (2014) for a review of the CFI.
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The ERF operates alongside a mandated Renewable Energy Target (RET) that requires an increas-
ing share of electricity to be sourced from renewable sources, as well as other policies aiming to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as regulations on lightbulbs. Direct Action also involves an
emissions “safeguard mechanism” to discourage large emitters from increasing their emissions above
historical benchmarks, due to commence on 1 July 2016. The safeguard mechanism has been set
loosely and flexibly. I will focus on the abatement subsidy component of Direct Action.4
Direct Action replaced a carbon pricing regime that had been in effect from 1 July 2012 to 30 June
2014. Introduced by the former Labor Government, the carbon price was initially A$23 per tonne
CO2-e. Removing the carbon price and switching to Direct Action was a key commitment of the
incoming Coalition Government at the 2013 election. The ERF was initially allocated A$2.55 billion
of taxpayer funds over four years (Australian Government, 2014). The first two auctions were held in
2015, and the third will be in late April 2016 (subsequent to the time of writing). A review of the ERF
is scheduled to commence in 2017.
The fundamental challenge for abatement subsidy schemes is their demanding information
requirements. Under either a basic emissions tax or a basic emissions trading scheme (ETS), the
Government needs to know only the emissions levels of covered entities; these entities are then
required to pay a tax or acquit permits for their emissions. In Australia, facility-level emissions are
already measured under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) scheme once
reporting thresholds are exceeded.5 Under a voluntary abatement subsidy scheme applied at the pro-
ject level, however, the Government should ideally know two sets of information: (1) the ongoing
emissions levels of participating projects; and (2) the emissions that would have been observed with-
out the subsidy (the true baseline or counterfactual). The second of these is difficult for the Govern-
ment to assess. Project proponents have much better information. There is an information
asymmetry.
The Government’s inability to know true project counterfactuals creates a major challenge. Projects
with overgenerous baselines will be able to submit relatively low auction bids because the abatement
they offer is largely non-additional, and thus cheap. These bids are well placed to secure funding. The
scheme is thus susceptible to providing windfall informational rents to anyway projects, while deliver-
ing less abatement than notionally indicated.6
Examples of anyway projects that might be funded are:
• Capturing gas to generate electricity (when doing so may generate a profit).
• Committing to not clear land (when there was no intention to clear).
• Improving the energy efficiency of aircraft (with evolving technological possibilities).
• Updating a firm’s car fleet with fuel-efficient models (to save fuel costs).
• Replacing a boiler (with one that does not leak like the current one).
• Retrofitting an industrial facility (as might be done from time to time).
• Improving a farm’s soil fertility (which improves soil carbon levels).
The information asymmetry means that emissions abatement fundamentally differs from other
government procurement processes. Take the purchase of a large quantity of office paper. The Com-
monwealth Procurement Rules require a tender, with essentially the lowest-price offer for a given
quantity and quality being awarded the job.7 The system works because there is no baseline problem;
there is almost no prospect of the private sector providing office paper as a free gift, so the counterfac-
tual is clear. Emissions abatement is different because every year the private sector naturally
4For details on the safeguard mechanism, see http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-
reduction-fund/about/safeguard-mechanism. My use of “baseline” will refer to baselines relevant for the ERF sub-
sidies, not the safeguard mechanism.
5See http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/NGER.
6Informational rents occur when the seller profits from knowing more than the buyer (Hanley et al., 2007).
7Small purchases can proceed using quotes rather than a formal open tender. The core rule of the Common-
wealth Procurement Rules is to achieve value for money (Department of Finance, 2014).
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implements projects that, on their own, happen to reduce emissions. If a reverse-auction payment
scheme is available, these anyway projects are well placed to win.
While Clarke et al. (2014, p. 316–317) note that Direct Action baselines are of “fundamental impor-
tance” and that funds might be used for projects “that would have occurred anyway” and Freebairn
(2014, p. 240) cautions that some funding will go to projects that would have been “undertaken any-
way,” Direct Action’s skew towards low-quality abatement has not received the attention it deserves
in the peer-reviewed literature. For example, Clarke et al. (2014) go on to use an estimate of the
national marginal abatement cost curve to calculate the abatement that could be purchased under
Direct Action, ignoring the key point that the scheme works on a project-by-project basis with a bias
towards non-additional projects. The low-quality nature of the Direct Action purchases has received
some media coverage (e.g. Edis, 2015a,b; Parkinson & Vorrath, 2015; Taylor, 2015).
The international literature provides substantial evidence on how subsidy payments for voluntary
conservation activities have been subject to baseline measurement issues that lead to adverse selec-
tion (Fraser, 1995; Ferraro, 2008, 2011; Canton et al., 2009; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Arnold et al.,
2013; Duke et al., 2013). Arnold et al. (2013, p. 388) conclude that reverse auctions for payments for
ecosystem services can produce “an extreme adverse selection” that delivers rents to landowners paid
to do what they intended to do anyway. Adverse selection is known to have compromised voluntary
cash-for-clunkers schemes (Sandler, 2012), voluntary energy conservation programmes (Hartman,
1988), and voluntary carbon credit schemes (van Kooten et al., 2015).
At the global level, adverse selection is widely understood to be undermining key sources of inter-
national emissions offsets, including the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
Joint Implementation (JI).8 Victor (2009, p. 343) concludes “the CDM has been a disaster. Many
CDM credits do not represent real reductions in emissions.” The CDM has been cited as a model for
Direct Action (Australian Government, 2014).
In the next Section, I explore the economics of abatement subsidy schemes and the adverse selec-
tion problem. Section 3 discusses the design of Direct Action, the results of the first two auctions, and
other disadvantages of the scheme. Section 4 documents a need for improved textbook coverage of
this issue. The final section concludes.
2. Economics of Abatement Subsidies
2.1 Graphical Representation
In this Section, I initially focus on the economics of firm-level schemes so as to allow a simple com-
parison of a tax and a subsidy. I represent a firm’s emissions by M, abatement by Z and the emissions
price by P. The firm’s demand for emissions is a negative function of price, as in Figure 1. If the price
is zero, its emissions will be M^. This is the baseline from which any intervention should be evaluated.
The introduction of a per-unit emissions tax (t) or per-unit abatement subsidy (s) increases the cost
of emitting and so should induce a reduction in emissions. If t = s, there are no implementation or
participation costs, firms are profit-maximising, and both firms and the Government have complete
information, then either approach will induce the same emissions reduction (“abatement”) in the
short run, with the firm now choosing to emit M#. The quantity of abatement is Z ¼ M^ M#. Short-
run equivalence between the tax and subsidy occurs because the marginal cost of emitting is the same
under either policy: the firm needs to pay the per-unit tax or forgo the per-unit subsidy.
The most attractive feature of the simple tax/subsidy approach is that the intervention can induce
abatement at least cost. Emissions from M# to M^ are the firm’s least valuable, as its willingness to pay
8An offset scheme is one in which firms are paid to reduce emissions (Bushnell, 2012). Firms covered by an
emissions tax or an ETS could be allowed to use voluntary offsets generated outside the scheme to reduce their
tax/permit liabilities. On adverse selection in international offset schemes, see Richards and Andersson (2001), Fis-
cher (2005), Wara (2008), Schneider (2009), Victor (2009), Millard-Ball and Ortolano (2010), Kerr and Millard-
Ball (2012), Richards and Huebner (2012a), Strand and Rosendahl (2012), Hahn and Richards (2013), He and
Morse (2013), Millard-Ball (2013), van Benthem and Kerr (2013), and Schneider and Kollmuss (2015).
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(=marginal abatement cost) is the lowest. These “low-hanging fruit” coincide with the emissions that
will be abated.
Figure 1 also reveals the main shortcoming of an abatement subsidy scheme. The information
required for the Government to implement the emissions tax is only M#, the firm’s observed post-tax
emissions level. The information required for the subsidy scheme is larger: the Government needs to
know M# (the post-subsidy emissions level) and also M^ (the baseline emissions level) to be able to
provide the subsidy for units M^ M#. M^ is unobservable; if the abatement subsidy is being paid, it is
an outcome that does not actually happen.9
Estimating M^ using data from before a subsidy scheme starts is typically inadequate. Changes in technol-
ogy and the economy lead to shifts in emissions demand curves. Firms in sunrise sectorsmay have increas-
ing demand to emit, while firms in sunset sectors may have declining demand. Commodity producers
have a demand linked to (difficult-to-forecast) international markets. Opportunities for energy efficiency
improvements arise in amanner that is hard to anticipate. It is often difficult to accurately predict M^.
2.2 Mathematical Representation
To demonstrate the potential for adverse selection in voluntary abatement subsidy schemes, I repre-
sent the emissions demand of firm i during year t as:
Mi;t ¼ ai;t  bi;tPi;t ð1Þ
where M, a, b, P ≥ 0, and a and b are parameters. Each firm faces a separate emissions price, as in a
reverse auction. The use of a linear emissions demand function simplifies the maths. Assume the
Government does not know Eq. (1), but has annual data on firm-level emissions, as is the case in
Australia for large emitters under the NGER scheme.
When Pi,t = 0, M^i;t ¼ ai;t. This is the true baseline/counterfactual. The Government is unaware of
this level in year t, as it does not know Eq. (1). I will use X to refer to the Government’s estimate of
M^, the emissions level from which an abatement subsidy would apply. For some firms, we are likely
to have Xi;t[ M^i;t (baseline overestimated). For others, Xi;t\M^i;t (baseline underestimated). In some
instances, we could have Xi;t ¼ M^i;t.
If there is a voluntary abatement subsidy available at a per-unit rate of si,t (≥0), then in the absence
of participation costs, each firm faces the following decision:
maxfnot participate;participateg ¼maxfpayoff ¼ 0;payoff ¼ subsidy payment abatement costg ð2Þ
Figure 1. Firm-Level Analysis of a Per-Unit Tax or Per-Unit Subsidy
9Baumol and Oates (1988) show that an abatement subsidy scheme can be considered to consist of (a) a tax on
emissions at rate t, and (b) a lump-sum abatement payment of sM^. If so, errors in the estimation of M^ will not have
any direct emissions implication. This representation does not apply to an opt-in abatement subsidy scheme with
no functional tax.
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If a firm participates and is able to receive the abatement subsidy for as many units of abatement as
it wishes, the total subsidy payment it receives will be:
st  ðXi;t M#i;tÞ ð3Þ
¼ st  ðXi;t  ai;t þ bi;tsi;tÞ ð4Þ
and the firm’s abatement will equal:
Zi;t ¼ M^i;t M#i;t ¼ bi;tsi;t ð5Þ
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) is the inverse abatement supply function:
MACi;t ¼ b1i;t Zi;t ð6Þ
Integrating with respect to Zi,t provides the abatement cost (AC):
ACi;t ¼ ð2bi;tÞ1Z2i;t ð7Þ
Note that Xi,t is irrelevant to the true cost of abatement.
Continuing to assume no participation costs,10 each firm will participate and deliver the abatement
associated with si,t if:
Subsidy payment – abatement cost > 0
si;t  ðXi;t  ai;t þ bi;tsi;tÞ  ð2bi;tÞ1ðbi;tsi;tÞ2[ 0 ð8Þ
si;t[2b1i;t ðM^i;t  Xi;tÞ ð9Þ
Firms with M^i;t[Xi;t will need a relatively high si,t to make participation in the scheme worthwhile.
These firms will find it difficult to be competitive in a reverse auction; they might well not register in
the first place. Firms with M^i;t Xi;t will be keen to participate at any positive per-unit subsidy rate,
offering more abatement when si,t is higher. For Xi;t  M^i;t units, the subsidy will be purely windfall in
nature.
In the context of a reverse auction, firms with M^i;t\Xi;t are in the best position to submit com-
petitive bids for a project of a certain minimum scale given that they face no costs for Xi;t  M^i;t.
Competitive bids win reverse auctions. This is thus a market that is susceptible to adverse selec-
tion. The greater the number of firms with generous baselines, the more serious the adverse
selection.
Adverse selection means that there is likely to be a distinction between the true abatement pro-
vided by an abatement subsidy scheme and announced quantities. If the reverse auction is won by N
firms, then:
AbatementTruet ¼
XN
i¼1 bi;t si;t
Abatement
Government‘s understanding
t ¼
XN
i¼1ðXi;t  M^i;t þ bi;tsi;tÞ
Information asymmetry and adverse selection mean that Xi;t  M^i;t will likely exceed zero for many
or all of the winning firms, a problem likely to be exacerbated by a behind-the scenes incentive for
the operator of the scheme to allow generous baselines (Millard-Ball, 2013). Announced abatement
achievements are thus likely to be overestimates.
10In practice, firms will also need to incorporate participation costs into their bids. I have excluded participation
costs to provide a simple demonstration of the importance of baselines and a direct comparison with a tax. It would
be possible to model alternative abatement cost functions, such as one for lumpy projects. Eq. (7) is a standard-
form, differentiable representation.
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Assuming offsets are disallowed, adverse selection does not affect either an emissions tax or an
ETS; a per-unit tax or permit price of st will induce abatement of bi,tst across all covered firms. Least-
cost abatement will be achieved even if emissions demand curves change in an unpredictable way on
a year-to-year basis.
2.3 Three Project Types
Turning to the project level, Figure 2 shows true and “Government-estimated” emissions baselines
for three types of projects: those for which the Government has an accurate estimate of the emissions
baseline into the future; those for which the baseline is overgenerous; and those for which the base-
line is underestimated.
The adverse selection process is not one in which baseline errors are averaged out. Instead, there is
a natural push for projects of Type B to dominate, irrespective of whether baseline errors are random
or systematic. Intermediaries will reinforce the process as they have an incentive to identify non-
additional projects.11 A push towards projects of Type B means that (a) the scheme will have a skew
to non-additional abatement, and (b) low-cost abatement opportunities from other potential projects
(Types A and C) will be missed. Instead of a market in abatement, we may end up with a market
dominated by anyway projects.
3. Direct Action
I now turn to the specifics of Direct Action’s design and describe the results of the first two auctions. I
then discuss other disadvantages of Direct Action.
3.1 Design
The ERF White Paper (Australian Government, 2014) does not mention “adverse selection” or “infor-
mation asymmetry.” While it does discuss the need to ensure abatement is genuine, a rather relaxed
Government’s estimate of baseline True baseline
Emissions
Time
Type A: baseline correct Type B: baseline overestimated
TimeTime
Type C: baseline underestimated
Emissions Emissions
Figure 2. The Three Types of Projects Competing in a Reverse Auction for Abatement Subsidies.
Projects of Type B can submit low auction bids and dominate the auction winners list, but the abatement they offer is
partly or fully non-additional (“anyway”). Projects of Type A and particularly C will find it difficult to compete, meaning
that low-cost abatement opportunities from these projects may be missed. The point applies (a) for alternative baseline
shapes (e.g. a declining baseline), and (b) at the facility and firm levels also. Time = 0 is the project start date.
11One intermediary has publically advised potential participants that the ERF should often be seen as “an addi-
tional revenue stream for projects that are going ahead for other reasons.”
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definition of additionality has been adopted. Specifically, the document states that a “flexible
approach to additionality” (p. 69) will be used “that minimises the costs to businesses and encourages
participation” (p. 22). Private co-benefits are emphasised (p. 7), but the difficulty is that projects that
provide private benefits may well be pursued anyway.
Section 27 of the CFI Act lists three additionality requirements:
(1) Newness: The project must not have already been implemented.
(2) Regulatory additionality: The project must not be required under law.
(3) Government programme requirement: The project must not be likely to be carried out under another
Government programme.
Across the Australian economy, new projects are launched every year, so the newness requirement
does not rule out anyway projects. Unlike the CDM, no test of financial additionality is being applied,
for the good reason that such tests are resource-intensive and easily manipulated. Projects developed
under the former CFI have received an exemption from the newness requirement.
The ERF’s process for defining projects and measuring project-by-project abatement uses methods
developed by the Department of the Environment.12 The methods are legislative instruments. While
the “common practice” test under the former CFI has been scrapped, the offsets integrity standards
under Section 133 of the CFI Act state that the methods “should result in carbon abatement that is
unlikely to occur in the ordinary course of events.” As discussed, the ordinary course of events is
often difficult for the Government to identify in a dynamic economy. There are separate methods for
individual activities, as well as a general facility-wide method. Thirty-three methods had been
approved as of mid-April 2016. An Emissions Reductions Assurance Committee considers draft
methods and provides advice to the Minister.
The methods generally use recent emissions or emissions intensity averages to form project base-
lines. Some allow for declining baselines over time; the land and sea transport method, for example,
uses declining emissions intensity baselines for some vehicle categories in recognition of ongoing
improvements in vehicle fuel economy. Some have more rigorous approaches to additionality than
others; the “aggregated small energy users” method requires a randomised control trial, for instance.
Projects that are required to use more demanding methods will find it difficult to be Type B (Figure 2)
and will also face higher participation costs. They will be less likely to participate.
The methods are detailed, complicated, and reflect considerable effort on the Government’s behalf.
There is a method for projects that reduce the emissions intensity of beef production by productivity-
enhancing steps such as increasing a herd’s weight:age ratio, reducing its average age, or reducing the
share of unproductive animals. The land and sea transport method covers the purchase of efficient
vehicles, use of bio-fuels, fitting of low-resistance tyres and other actions. The aviation method covers
fuel-saving steps such as replacing aircraft parts with lighter alternatives. And so on. There are private
incentives for these activities. While the methods do exclude many types of bogus project ideas, they
thus also leave ample opportunity for anyway projects.
Direct Action’s adverse selection problem is exacerbated by the ability of project proponents to
influence their own baseline. It is the proponent’s responsibility to identify their baseline in accor-
dance with approved methods, and there is some flexibility. For example, a proponent could apply an
activity method or the facilities method, or choose between a method relying on direct measurement
or one using model-based defaults (e.g. for soil carbon). Project proponents should be expected to
define their abatement as favourably as possible.
Participants whose projects underperform in the implementation phase are allowed to purchase
ACCUs from other registered projects and then deliver these to the Government under make-good
provisions (Australian Government, 2014). If non-additional projects are credited with ACCUs, a
behind-the-scenes dynamic for anyway projects thus continues well after any ERF auction, from pro-
jects that did not even receive an ERF contract. Project underperformance is a real risk: the Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO, 2010) reported that projects funded by the Greenhouse Gas Abatement
12See https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction-fund/methods.
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Program (GGAP) delivered “substantially less than originally planned” (p. 17). GGAP was a federal
grants scheme for initiatives to reduce emissions – a precursor to Direct Action.
3.2 The first two auctions
The first ERF auction, in April 2015, saw forty-four participants receive abatement contracts for a
total of 144 projects, with an average price per tonne CO2-e of A$13.95 and a total commitment of
A$660.5 million. Awarded contracts cover 47.3 million tonnes of notional abatement, with lengths
ranging three to ten years.
Almost 60 per cent of the abatement purchased in the first auction was from avoided deforestation
projects centred on Cobar and Bourke in New South Wales, awarded to leaseholders with permits to
clear invasive native species (“woody weeds”). Only permits predating 1 July 2010 are eligible. Large
sums of money – often many times the value of the land (Taylor, 2015) – have been awarded for pro-
jects involving little effort. The payments rest on the assumption that clearing would have happened
without the subsidy. Given the size of the payments, it seems likely that some vegetation has indeed
been preserved, albeit at a high price. Some of the spending has questionable additionality, however,
given that the incentive to clear was anyway rather low (clearing is expensive and the productivity of
the land is low) and that there is an incentive to identify the most marginal land to offer up to the
scheme. In my discussions with local stakeholders, Direct Action revenue was referred to as “cream”
and “too good to be true.”
Most of the remainder of the payments in the first auction went to landfill gas projects. Like the
avoided deforestation projects, these are also carry-overs from the former CFI. Many have been run-
ning for years, with the operators using the gas to generate revenue from (a) electricity production,
and (b) renewable energy certificates under the RET (Cannane & Andersen, 2015; Edis, 2015b).
Many have a private incentive to operate.
The second ERF auction was held in November 2015. The Government signed 129 contracts worth
a total of A$557 million, for 45.45 million tonnes of CO2-e abatement. The average price was
A$12.25 per tonne. Fifty-six per cent of the contracted abatement was from vegetation projects, 15
per cent from altering savanna fire management, 9 per cent from agriculture, and the remainder from
energy efficiency projects, landfill and waste, transport and industrial fugitives. One project received
funding to upgrade lighting in supermarkets; another to increase the fuel efficiency of vehicles and
marine vessels; another to use piggery gas to generate electricity. There are private benefits to these
projects. They are the type of activities that are supposed to occur in a market economy.
Australian Carbon Credit Units could be used as offsets under the former carbon pricing scheme, as
well as in the voluntary market, with most early-vintage ACCUs coming from the waste sector (Cli-
mate Change Authority, 2014). Questions over the additionality of ACCUs pre-date the ERF. Repu-
Tex (2014), for example, concluded:
Almost all current ACCU generating projects . . . have alternative revenue streams that can inde-
pendently finance a project payback of less than three years. As a result, the main economic driver
of nearly all existing projects is the desire to reduce energy bills and/or sell energy to another party,
with the revenue from ACCUs most often treated as a bonus. (p. 5)
3.3 Other disadvantages
In addition to the adverse selection of non-additional abatement, there are numerous other disadvan-
tages of the Direct Action subsidy approach (Jotzo & Burke, 2014). The first is that considerable
administrative effort is required on behalf of the Government in developing methods and judging
and monitoring individual abatement projects. Project proponents also face substantial participation
costs, including costs related to understanding the complicated ERF methods.
Another is that many low-hanging abatement opportunities will be missed. ERF projects must be
of a minimum scale (2,000 tonnes of CO2-e per year), and while the aggregation of small-scale initia-
tives into a single ERF project is allowed, paperwork and monitoring requirements mean that some
actions may never be able to receive funding under the scheme. How could a contract be properly
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enforced to incentivise cycling to work once a week, for instance? A broad-based carbon price incen-
tivises such actions; subsidy contracts would be unworkable (Freebairn, 2014). As discussed, projects
that do not receive favourable treatment from the ERF’s methods will find it difficult to be competi-
tive in the reverse auctions.
The electricity sector, which accounts for around one-third of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions,
is a particular weak-spot for Direct Action. It is fundamentally challenging for an abatement subsidy
scheme to incentivise reductions across an electricity generation system, as reductions from any sin-
gle facility may be directly replaced by increases from others (“leakage”). As is, the facilities method
(the method that may be used by electricity generators) is restricted to projects that reduce a facility’s
emissions intensity rather than its emissions. Electricity-sector emissions declined by 9 per cent over
the two years of the carbon price and have increased since its removal (Figure 3). While there are
many factors affecting electricity-sector emissions in any single year, it is fair to conclude that the car-
bon price provided an incentive for emissions reductions in the electricity sector that Direct Action is
not providing.
The risk of emissions leakage is a concern outside the electricity sector also. Abated emissions might
simply reappear elsewhere (Chomitz, 2002; Kerr & Millard-Ball, 2012; Richards & Huebner, 2012b).
One example is farmers using Direct Action payments to fund tree clearing on other properties. Some
projects might even cause a net increase in emissions. The ERF’s design does not have a strong focus
on preventing leakage: the CFI Act, ERF White Paper, and key methods (e.g. the facilities method) do
not mention the term. While section 133 of the CFI Act requires deductions for emissions that are “a
direct consequence of carrying out the project” and “material” in scale, this does not extend to indi-
rect leakage. The full extent of emissions leakage is typically difficult to measure.
Another downside to Direct Action is that subsidies are funded by taxes, which cause distortion
costs to the economy. An emissions tax or ETS, on the other hand, could be used to replace distorting
taxes and play a role in broader tax reform. Direct Action is exacerbating Australia’s budget deficit;
carbon revenue could be reducing it.
Direct Action has also introduced some undesirable incentives. Firms have an incentive to delay
emissions-reducing projects until they are registered with the CER. State and territory Governments
have an incentive to avoid initiatives that reduce emissions so as to not disqualify projects from the
ERF. Such schemes also risk instilling a culture of subsidies and Government involvement in project
selection.
Figure 3. Changes in Australia’s Electricity-Sector Emissions, by Fiscal Year.
Source: Department of the Environment (2015, 2016). Data are for unadjusted emissions over the year to the end of
June. The carbon price was applied for fiscal years 2012–2013 and 2013–2014.
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Finally, the cost ineffectiveness resulting from anyway projects can be exacerbated when there is a
strong expectation of what the highest funded price will be.13 The reason for this is that it can be an
attractive strategy to build a healthy rent margin into reverse-auction bids. A repeated auction for-
mat, as used for Direct Action, is particularly prone to overpriced bids, as unsuccessful project propo-
nents can expect to re-bid in future auction rounds.
4. Textbook Coverage
Textbooks in environmental economics often demonstrate the potential short-run equivalence
between emissions taxes and abatement subsidies, but most do not adequately convey the point that
abatement subsidy schemes can be undermined by information asymmetry problems. Table 1 details
how seventeen environmental economics textbooks cover abatement subsidy schemes. Hanley et al.
(2007) provide the most comprehensive coverage.
5. Conclusion
Australia’s Direct Action abatement subsidies provide an example of an environmental intervention
vulnerable to adverse selection. The key disadvantage of the scheme is that it funds individual pro-
jects in a context in which it is difficult to determine if they would have happened anyway. The cost
advantage of anyway projects means that they are well placed to win the ERF auctions. The experience
to date suggests that this issue is a real concern and that there are indeed opportunities for anyway
projects to receive windfall rents. The purpose of a reverse auction is to minimise procurement costs,
but reverse auctions can be cost-ineffective when adverse selection occurs and purchased abatement
is actually non-additional. The main lesson from the Direct Action experience is that it is preferable to
design schemes that do not rely on difficult-to-observe information such as counterfactual project
baselines. Direct Action has extended the additionality concerns surrounding the former CFI to an
economy-wide basis.
One way to reform the current arrangements is to tighten Direct Action’s safeguard mechanism
and operate it as a baseline-and-credit scheme without Government subsidies. There are many design
decisions for such a scheme, including whether to use absolute or emissions intensity baselines
(Wood et al., 2016). A baseline-and-credit scheme would be an improvement over the current sub-
sidy approach, although it should be kept in mind that a share of permits traded will be anyway in nat-
ure, generated by firms that happen to be below their Government-determined baseline.14 A
baseline-and-credit scheme is also likely to have higher administrative and lobbying costs than a stan-
dard ETS, provide less certainty over the achievement of an emissions target, and miss out on rev-
enue that could be used to reduce Australia’s budget deficit or for other purposes. A standard ETS
would hence be preferable.
An emissions tax is in several respects even more attractive than an ETS: it is administratively sim-
pler, trading costs can be avoided, and price uncertainty minimised. Australia’s recent climate policy
history suggests that an ETS is likely to be more politically viable than an emissions tax, however. In
some sectors – such as landfill, coal mining and avoided deforestation – well-designed and enforced
regulatory approaches are also an option.
Considerable work has gone into developing the ERF project methods. For emissions already cov-
ered by the NGER scheme this work is superfluous to Australia’s long-term requirements given that
policy alternatives exist that avoid the adverse selection problem. Several of the other methods may
be of long-term use for measuring emissions offsets. If Australia is to return to either an emissions tax
or ETS, the issue of adverse selection means that care will be needed in the design of any offset
arrangements.
13The CER sets a secret benchmark price and then chooses a percentage of bids below this level, subject to the
ERF budget (Australian Government, 2014).
14See MacGill et al. (2006) and Passey et al. (2008) for discussions of earlier baseline-and-credit schemes such as
the New SouthWales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme. See Maron et al. (2015) for a discussion of issues related
to baseline setting in biodiversity offsetting schemes.
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